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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action arising under a uniform real estate
contract by which the defendants, Mayne, sold certain motel
property in Roy, Utah, to the plaintiffs, Strand, and the
plaintiffs seek to avoid forfeiture of payments made on a
contract and improvements made on the premises.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
From a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint
with prejudice upon motion of the defendant for summary
judgment, the plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and permission
to go to trial upon the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants' complaint for a first cause of action
(R.l) alleges that April1, 1955 the plaintiffs as buyer entered into the contract marked Exhibit "A" and attached to

the complaint with the defendants for the purchase of real
estate consisting of land and seventeen motel units and certain personal property in Roy, Weber County, Utah. That
the total purchase price was $41,500.00, of \Vhich the plaintiffs paid $7,578.58 as down payment and thereafter made
additional payments up to and including the 3rd day of
October, 1957 of $10,875.00. That in addition, the appellants,
in order to place the property in habitable condition, expended for repairs, improvements, additions and equipment
$9,567.37 which included converting a previously unusable
portion of the front of the premises into a restaurant and
coffee shop. That the total payments and improvements
made by the appellants was the sum of $29,020.95; that the
repairs and improvements made by the appellants increased
1
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the market value of the property by at least $25,000.00.
That after the execution of the agreement, the respondents
wrongfully and continually interfered with the rental of the
units of the motel and by reason of such interference the
plaintiffs were unable to make payments after November
3, 1957. That on or about January 8, 1958 the respondents
repossessed the premises. That the reasonable rental value
of the premises was the sum of $450.00 per month; that the
retention by the respondents of the premises and payments
theretofore made would be inequitable and unconscionable,
and the appellants requested the court to determine the
compensation to which the respondents might equitably
be entitled and for such other relief as to the court was
proper in the premises.
For second cause of action the appellants alleged that
the respondents made certain representations with respect
to the habitable condition, the roof, the floor and sewer
connection, upon which the appellants relied and were induced to enter into the agreement, and that by reason of
the falsity of the representations and the reliance thereon
by the appellants, the appellants were damaged in the
amount of $29,020.95.
The answer of the respondents was generally a denial
of the allegations of the complaint. Subsequently, the respondents filed an amended answer and counter-claim wherein the respondents alleged that the appellants on March 20,
1957 sold the property to Watterson under uniform real
estate contract marked Exhibit "1" and attached to the
answer and counter-claim, and that by such sale the appellants lost all of their rights and claims against the respondents. The respondents then allege on information and
belief that certain individuals, Lucy Semora and Verda
Lynn, as successors in interest to the appellants and Wattersons came into possession of the premises and that the
respondents on or about January 8, 1958, commenced an
action in the District Court for Weber County against Lucy
Semora and Verda Lynn seeking restitution of the premises, and that such action against Lucy Semora and Verda
2
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Lynn constituted res adjudicata as against the appellants
(R.16). Respondents further alleged that the provision of
the contract for liquidated damaged was binding upon the
appellants. Answering the second cause of action relative
to fraud, the respondents alleged that the appellants had
inspected the premises, sought independent counsel and
advice, relied upon their own judgment, were not misinformed and were bound by the provision of the contract
that the buyer accept the premises in the present condition;
that the appellants having elected to remain in possession
of the premises after discovering the fraud were precluded
from rescinding, and are estopped to make any claim against
the defendants.
The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment
(R.29) and a brief in support of a motion for summary
judgment (R.30), and there having been several continuances in the interim, the respondents filed a new motion
for summary judgment on October 13, 1961 (R.53) accompanied by an affidavit which recited that the attached brief
in support of summary judgment supports the motion for
summary judgment.
Depositions were taken, interrogatories were propounded, and requests for admissions of fact were presented.
The final brief of the respondents in support of the
motion for summary judgment is contained in pages 76 to
98 of the record, and the brief of the plaintiffs resisting the
motion for summary judgment is contained in pages 99 to
103 of the record. The facts as presented to the trial court
in connection with the motion for summary judgment as
contained in the brief and representations of the parties
are graphically summarized as follows:
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I

(R.110) (Tr. 12-15)
Mayne sold to Strand:
(R.5) Uniform Real Estate Contract, April 1, 1955.
Purchase Price ____________________ $41,500.00
7,578.58
Down Payment __________________
Subsequent Payments:
Interest __________ $ 4,156.52
Principal ________
7,732.57

$33,921.42

$11,889.09
(Tr. 13) Balance of Principal as of 12/3/57
$26,188.85
Improvements by Strand __ $11,726.77
Down Payment ____________________ 7,578.58
Subsequent Payments ________ 11,889.09
Total Investment by
Strand ------------------------------ $31,194.44
(Not including current expenses)
Period occupied: 4/1/55 to 1/6/58 = 33 months
Reasonable Rental Value $450.00 per month= $14,850.00
Market Value on January 6, 1958 = $63,000.00
(Market value claimed by Respondents as of December 15,
1961, $35,000.00, R. 97).
II

Strand sold by new contract to Watterson:
(R.22) Uniform Real Estate Contract, March 20, 1957.
Purchase Price ____________________ $63,000.00
500.00
Recited Down Payment ____
Payment by assignment of
equities in two other contracts:
a. Nephi property netted nothing - Valueless
b. Salt Lake property may realize ____ $2,000.00
DEFAULTED and FORFEITED by Notice 1/29/58

4
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III
Watterson assigned the contract with Strand to Goldsby and
Clinger July 31, 1957
Defaulted and Forfeited by notice 1/29/58
IV

(See File #33330, R. 117)
Action by Mayne for Repossession:
a. Notice to quit served upon Lucy Semora dated
1/8/58, and signed by John A. Hendricks, attorney for
Mayne.

b. Complaint by Mayne vs. Lucy Semora and Verda
Lynn, dated January 13, 1958, for restitution of possession.
c. Semora and Lynn answered in general denial, then
subsequently by letter of attorney Tel Charlier, disclaimed,
January 31, 1958.
d. Decree February 10, 1958, awarded possession of
premises to Mayne.

v
Action Commenced by Strand vs. Mayne May 13, 1958.
The court heard the arguments of the parties on April
23, 1962 and took the matter under advisement (R.105). A
transcript of the proceedings is included in the record (R.
116). The court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice on May 16, 1962, (R.109). Appellants
filed a motion for rehearing (R.106) and requested among
other things that the court indicate the points upon which
the court relied in granting the motion for summary judgment, which motion for rehearing was denied by the court.
ARGUMENT
In the conclusion to the respondents' brief (R.96) the
respondents set forth four grounds upon which they con5
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tended the motion for summary judgment was well taken
and the trial court not having specified the grounds upo~
which the judgment was granted, it is assumed that one
or more of the four grounds stated by the respondents in
their conclusion was the basis for the judgment and accordingly these grounds become the points of argument.
Point 1.

That the appellants' claim against the respondents was not res adjudicata.

There was never any notice of default or forfeiture
served by the respondents upon the appellants, nor was any
action ever taken by the respondents against the appellants
upon the contract between the respondents and appellants.
The respondents proceeded to recover possession from Lucy
Semore and Verda Lynn by an action in the District Court
for Weber County, Civil No. 33330 (R.117), but nowhere
does it appear that Lucy Semora or Verda Lynn had anything but a possessory interest in the premises. There was
no privity of contract between the respondents and any
other persons other than the appellants. The appellants
never assigned the contract with the respondents to any
other party, but contracted anew by separate real estate
contract with the subsequent possessors, Watterson, and
Watterson subsequently assigned to Goldsby and Clinger.
The contract between the appellants and respondents never
having been assigned, there is no contractual relationship
between the respondents and any other party other than
the appellants. The action by the respondents against Lucy
Semora and Verda Lynn was solely for possession of the
premises under a wrongful detention proceeding, and in
no way purported to adjudicate the rights of the parties
under any contract. As stated in Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah
2d 124, 270 P.2d 442, an unla\vful detainer action is an
action to ren1ove a tenant from possession and is primarily
against the person in possession; it is not similar to a quiet
title action where anyone with an interest should be joined
(Page 126) and the rights of the defendants under the contract are not considered. (Page 129). The only issue raised
6
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in Civil No. 33330 was that of right to possession as against
persons having no contract interest in the property and
did not purport to litigate the rights of parties under the
contract.
Point 2.

The appellants by contracting under a new
uniform real estate contract to sell the premises to Wattersons did not lose their estate,
interest or contractual rights as against the
respondents.

It is to be noted that the appellants at no time assigned,
transferred or disposed of any of its interest in the contract
between the appellants and respondents, but entered into
a new uniform real estate contract with Wattersons. As
such the contractual relationship between the appellants
and respondents remained and the appellants had separate
contractual obligations to Wattersons. Wattersons assigned
the Strand-Watterson contract to Goldsby and Clinger.
Strand, by notice served January 29, 1958 upon default of
Wattersons, Goldsby and Clinger, declared a forfeiture of
the Watterson contract which was met by inaction of the
part of Wattersons, Goldsby and Clinger. Watterson had
agreed by contract to pay Strand $63,000.00 for the premises payable $500.00 down and $13,500.00 by the assignment of equities in two other contracts recited to be worth
$13,500.00, but which in fact may be worth only $2,000.00
if and when Strand recovers on one of the contracts relating to Salt Lake City property. However assuming that
Strand received $14,000.00 of the $63,000.00 purchase price,
there was still due and owing to Strand the difference between the $49,000.00 balance due from Watterson to Strand
and the $26,000.00 balance due from Strand to Mayne, a
difference of $23,000.00 still due from Watterson to Strand
before Watterson could succeed to Strands interest or
equity in the property. If Strand had been paid out by Watterson, instead of still being owed about $23,000.00, the
argument of the respondent that Strand no longer had an
interest in the contract may have some merit, but it does not
7
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seem reasonable to contend that a purchaser who contracts
to sell his interest thereby forfeits his interest in the property, whether or not his own vendee has performed. While
there do not seem to be many cases on this point it has
been held that the purchaser is entitled on default of his
grantee, to take possession of the premises and carry out
the contract of purchase Hill v. Preston, 34 S. W. 2d 780,
119 Tex. 522. Even in the case of an assignment it is generally held that the original vendor's acceptance of an assignment made by his purchaser does not place the assignee
of the purchaser in privity of contract with the original
vendor, 59 A. L. R. 954. Accordingly the privity between
the original vendor and the purchaser remains in absence
of a novation.
Point 3.

Appellants interest in the contract with the
respondent has not been forfeited or terminated.

The respondents at no time served notice of default
or notice of forfeiture under the contract with the appellants
and until such notice is served the issue of damages cannot
be resolved. The provision for forfeiture is not self executing and written notice is necessary. Howorth v. Mills, 62
Utah 574, 221 P. 165; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.
2d 699.
Point 4.

The appellants are entitled to maintain this
action to avoid forfeiture of the improvements and payments made by the appellants.

The appellants and purchasers were in possession of the
property about thirty three months, from April 1, 1955 to
January 6, 1958, during which period a purchase price of
$41,500.00 was reduced to $26,188.85, and the appellants
made improvements including the creation and equipment
of a coffee shop which theretofore did not exist on the
premises, with the cost of said improvements of about
$11,726.77. The total investment by the appellants, as re8
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viewed supra (P 4), was $31,194.44. The difference between $31,194.44, the total investment in improvements and
payments by appellants and the rental value for a 33 month
period of $14,850.00 is the sum of $16,344.44, which is 39%
of the original purchase price. The appellants contended
that the market value of the property on or about March
20, 1957 was between $63,000.00 and $75,000.00 (R. 77) and
represented to the court that at the time of repossession on
January 6, 1958, the property had a market value of $63,000.00 (R. 110). The respondents supplied an affidavit dated
April 18, 1962 that the market value of the property as of
December 15, 1961 was $35,000.00.
The rule with respect to measure of damages is stated
in Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 to be the
difference between the contract price with interest and the
value of the land at the time of re-entry, less any payments
made on the contract. This doctrine was amplified in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, and the
wording of the opinion is such as to incorporate the basis
for relief as being unjust enrichment and unconscionable
advantage. Spencer sold a home in Provo to the plaintiff
Perkins and brought suit in the city court in an unlawful
detainer action alleging forfeiture of the contract. Perkins
then commenced an action in the district court to avoid the
strict effects of the forfeiture provision. The total purchase
price was $10,500.00 of which Perkins had paid $2,500.00
down and $75.00 a month, the $75.00 being a reasonable
rental value of the premises. The trial court allowed the
defendant to keep the payments as liquidated damages and
awarded treble damages for unlawful detainer. This was
reversed on appeal, first, as to the treble damages as the
notice to quit was not properly served and strict statutory
compliance was required. With respect to the forfeiture as
liquidated damages of the amount paid, the court reviewed
several cases and established certain criteria. The court
quotes from Restatement of Contracts, Section 339, that
the agreement for liquidated damages will be enforceable
if (a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach,
9
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and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that
is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. This
court then commenced a review of many Utah cases wherein they state that liquidated damages are enforceable where
the amount stipulated is not disproportionate to the damage
actually sustained, but that no forfeiture is allowed where
the same is unconscionable and exhorbitant. In the case
of Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 977 where the forfeiture amounted to about 10% of the purchase price, and
in the case of Cristy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P. 2d 401,
where the monthly income exceeded the total payments plus
improvements, this court held that the forfeiture did not
amount to a penalty. However in Malmberg v. Baugh, 62
Utah 331, 218 P. 975, where $4,450.00 of the full contract
price of $10,000.00 was paid during the period of occupancy
of twenty-two months, this court clearly indicated that they
regarded forfeiture of such sum as excessive and would not
allow its retention. The opinion of the Perkins case quotes
from Young v. Hansen, 117 Utah 591, 218 P. 2d 666 as
follows:
''The contract did not provide for the retention of
money, and even if it did, it is questionable that such
provision could be enforced as defendants \Vould
acquire an unconscionable advantage and, be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiffs as
there is no showing that the defendants had suffered any damage."
The Perkins case sets forth a formula for determining
the damages due the seller as follows:
''The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned
them by any of these factors:

(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain;
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the prop-

erty;
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market
value of the property not allowed for in items
nos. 1 and 2, and

10
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(4) For the fair rental value of the property during the period of occupancy.
The total of such sums should be deducted from the
total amount paid in, plus any improvements for
which it would be fair to allow recovery, and any
remain difference a warded to the plaintiffs."
Justice Wolf in a concurring opinion states that the
market value determined at the time of repossession includes therein depreciation and need not be separately calculated.
In defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs' contentions must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of permitting the plaintiffs to go to trial; and only
if when the \Vhole rna tter is so viewed, the plaintiffs nevertheless could establish no right to recovery should the
motion be granted.
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P2d 344; Morris
v. Farnsworth Motel et al. 123 Utah 289, 259 P2d 297.
In the appellants' motion for rehearing (R. 106-108)
the appellants requested the trial court to give some indication of the grounds upon which the motion for summary judgment was granted in order that the appellants
might present opposing affidavits, amend or otherwise support its position. The court denied the motion for rehearing.
In other cases this court has held:
"It must appear to a certainty that the plaintiff would
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of its claim before
a judgment on the pleading may be granted."
Securities Credit Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265
P2d 422.
"The sustaining of summary motions without affording the party an opportunity to present his evidence
is a stringent measure which courts should be reluctant to grant . . . Accordingly, the privilege of
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

presenting evidence should be denied only when, taking the view most favorable to the party' claims, he
could not in any event establish a right to redress
under the law; and unless it clearly so appears,
doubts should be resolved in favor of permitting him
to go to trial''.
Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d. 388, 367 P2d 179.
In addition to the many issues raised by the points
above which are yet to be resolved there was the issue of
damages for fraud. The respondents took the position that
the only remedy which the appellants would have in the
event of fraud was for rescission and that their failure to
return the premises denied them the right of rescission.
There is also the remedy of damages for fraud which is
available to the appellants in which they may forgo the
right to rescind and retain what they have received and
bring an action at law to recover damages sustained. McKellar v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128; 24 Am Jur 8,
Fraud and Deceit, sections 190 and 191.
Appellants respectfully request that the judgment of
the trial court be reversed and the cause remanded for
trial.
Respectfully,
GEORGE K. FADEL

Attorney for Appellants
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